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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and Respondent Johnson filed an action in 
Seventh Circuit Court in and for Uintah County seeking inter 
alia to obtain judgment against the Defendants/Appellants 
Slaugh under a three-party contract entered into between the 
parties to this appeal and Eagle Mills, dated June 11, 1985. 
After the trial court had heard the testimony of the parties 
and witnesses and reviewed the agreement between the three 
parties and following a review of all the evidence found that 
the agreement did not impose personal liability upon the 
Defendants Slaugh for the obligation of Eagle Mills to 
purchase and pay for stock owned by the Plaintiffs Johnson. 
The Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the trial court 
to the District Court on the issue of the personal liability 
of Slaughs purchasing and paying for stock of the Johnsons. 
Both parties filed arguments and on August 22, 1986, the 
District Court issued a ruling finding that the signatures of 
the Slaughs were unrestricted and imposing personal liability 
upon them for the obligations set forth in the contract as 
belonging to Eagle Mills, Inc. 
Defendants moved for reconsideration or rehearing to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the District Court by 
minute entry dated September 25, 1986, denied 
Defendant/Respondents1 Motion to Dismiss and Motion for 
Rehearing. Whereupon Defendants Slaugh initiated this appeal 
on October 24, 1986. Petition for summary disposition on the 
issue of jurisdiction in this court was denied. 
Plaintiff/Respondentsf motion was denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 11, 1985, the Slaugh, the Johnsons and Eagle 
Mills, Inc., entered into a three-party agreement. Murray 
and Pamela Johnson signed under the heading Johnson and James 
and Deanna Slaugh signed under the heading Slaugh. James 
Slaugh signed as the president of Eagle Mills and Pamela 
Johnson as Secretary. The Slaughs and the Johnsons also 
convened a meeting of the shareholders and board of directors 
of Eagle Mills and authorized Eagle Mills to enter into the 
agreement. See Plaintiffs1 Exhibit #1 and Addendum A. 
Paragraph 8 of the agreement called for Eagle Mills to 
buy from the Johnsons stock for $7,500.00 which the Johnsons 
owned in Eagle Mills. The agreement provided that the 
payment to the Johnsons was to be made in two installments of 
$3,750.00 each. The first installment has already been paid; 
the second installment is the subject of the underlying 
dispute in this case. The agreement created further, 
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separate obligations and rights in each of the three parties. 
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit #1 and Addendum A. 
In September, 1985, Plaintiffs Johnson commenced an 
action against both Eagle Mills and the Slaughs alleging, 
inter alia, breach of the obligation, in paragraph 10 of the 
agreement, to pay the second installment of $3,750.00 to 
Plaintiffs. Judgment against Eagle Mills was obtained by 
default. The action between the Johnsons and the Slaughs was 
tried in the Seventh Circuit Court in and for Uintah County. 
In a signed Memorandum Decision dated February 28, 1986, 
the trial court found the following: that the agreement "was 
entered into and signed by three entities . . . ;fT that ff[i]n 
paragraph 8 of the contract, Eagle Mills, Inc., agreed to pay 
Johnson $7,500.00 for 200 shares of stock. Payment of this 
amount was the obligation of Eagle Mills and not the 
responsibility of Slaughs."; and, that the Johnsons had "no 
cause of action" against the Slaughs for the balance owing 
under the agreement. See Record page 41 and Addendum B. 
On or about April 1, 1986, Plaintiffs appealed the 
decision of the Circuit Court to the Seventh Judicial 
District Court of Uintah County on the issue of whether the 
Slaughs are "individually, jointly and severally liable to 
the Plaintiffs for a balance due under the purchase agreement 
for the sum of $3,700.00." 
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On August 22, 1986, the District Court issued a Ruling 
on Appeal, addressing the issue of "whether or not an 
unrestricted signature on a contract establishes liability of 
the signer." The District Court reversed the findings of the 
Circuit Court, stating that "Defendants Slaugh signed the 
contract without restriction, even though the contract 
appears to be with the Defendant Corporation." See record 
page 68 and Addendum C. 
The Slaughs' subsequent Motion to Dismiss and Motion for 
Rehearing was denied by a minute entry of the District Court 
dated September 25, 1986, and a Docketing Statement with this 
Court on October 22, 1986. The motion by the Johnsons for 
Summary Dispositon of this appeal was denied on January 5, 
1987. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT < 
When this case was tried in the Circuit Court, that 
court was faced with the question of what obligations were * 
incurred by each of the parties to the agreement. The 
question is a mixed question of fact and law and substantial 
extrinsic evidence was admitted and relied on in making a 
decision. 
The agreement involved multiple promises made by three 
i 
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promisors to three promisees. The Plaintiffs urged the court 
to find Defendants Slaugh personally liable for the 
obligation of Eagle Mills to purchase and pay for Johnsons 
stock, while Defendants argued that the purchase was solely 
the responsibility of Eagle Mills. The Slaughs did not sign 
a personal guarantee for the contractural obligations of 
Eagle Mills, Inc. It was the duty of the Circuit Court to 
resolve this factual question by looking at the language of 
the instrument, the signatures, and the evidence at trial to 
determine the objective intent of the parties. The Circuit 
Court found that the Slaughs had no liability to pay the 
Johnsons for the Johnsons' stock. 
Significantly, the District Court was not called upon to 
resolve this question de novo, but rather to determine if 
the evidence adequately supported the findings of the Circuit 
Court. 
Rather than deal with the factual question, the District 
Court focused on the signatures on the agreement and 
addressed the question of the effect of an unrestricted 
signature, treating this question as dispositive of the 
liability of the parties. While the District Court 
acknowledged that the agreement to pay the Johnsons for their 
stock appeared to run between the Johnsons and Eagle Mills, 
Inc., the court proceeded to hold the Slaughs personally 
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liable for that obligation. The effect of the District 
Courtfs ruling was to overturn, or ignore, the Circuit 
Court's finding that the obligation in question was an 
obligation of Eagle Mills, Inc., which created no liability 
on the part of the Slaughs. The District Court's erroneous 
application of law and its failure to pay deference to the 
factual findings of the Circuit Court call for a reversal by 
this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT AND 
IMPOSING PERSONAL LIABILITY ON THE DEFENDANTS FOR THE 
CONTRACTURAL OBLIGATION OF EAGLE MILLS, INC. 
Although contract interpretation is generally a question 
of law, it may also become a question of fact when extrinsic 
evidence is used to aid in the interpretation of the 
agreement. Kimball v Campbell, 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985). 
In this case extrinsic evidence was introduced. Deanna 
Slaugh testified that she acted as the treasurer of Eagle 
Mills, Inc., in stopping payment on the check which would 
have paid the Johnsons the disputed amount of money, and that 
she derived no personal gain from taking this action. Tr. 
pp. 22-23. The actual check on which payment had been 
i 
stopped was introduced into evidence and identified as 
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originating with Eagle Mills, Inc. Tr. pp. 8-9. And, 
witnesses, including the Johnsons, were permitted to testify 
as to their understanding of the agreement as well as the 
previous course of dealing under the agreement. Tr. pp. 4-7, 
14-19. In its Memorandum Decision, the Circuit Court 
expressly relies on "the testimony and evidence presented at 
trial." Hence, the Circuit Court conducted significant 
actual inquiry in addition to its legal analysis. 
The Circuit Court first addressed the question of 
whether the Slaughs and any personal liability at all under 
the agreement. The Slaughs had signed both in their 
individual capacities under the heading "Slaugh" and (in the 
case of James Slaugh) again as President of Eagle Mills, Inc. 
The Circuit Court held had the agreement was between three 
parties, and ordered the Slaughs to perform the obligations 
of "Slaugh" specified in one covenant of the agreement. 
Having determined the existence of liability for the 
obligation for "Slaugh," there still remained the question of 
whether liability of Slaughs was restricted to the 
obligations of Slaugh or whether they were also liable for 
the obligations of Eagle Mills, Inc. Determining which of 
these types of liability existed was a factual inquiry which 
required an examination of the intentions of the parties as 
expressed in the language of the contract, Federal Deposit 
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Insurance Corporation v Bismark Investment Corporation, 547 
P.2d 212, 214 (Utah 1976); 17A C.J.S. Contracts, §350, 
together with the extrinsic evidence adduced at trial. 
The trial court, after hearing and reviewing all of the 
evidence at trial found that the particular obligation at 
issue here, i.e., that created by paragraph 8 of the 
contract, was the sole and separate obligation of Eagle Mills 
and was not a joint obligation of the party designated as 
Slaugh. 
A contract may be made between more than two parties, in 
this case three, and when the duties and obligations under 
the contract are clearly designated as running to one party 
or another, all of the parties to the contract do not become 
jointly and severally liable for the performance of the other 
party's duties and obligations. This court has ruled in the 
case of Kiddman v White, 378 P.2d 898 (Utah 1963) that a 
Defendant being sued on a contract executed by her was bound 
only to the extent the terms therein expressly indicated or 
i 
at least fairly and reasonably implied and that the 
Plaintiffs had the burden of establishing that the Defendant 
had contracted to perform obligations they sought to place 
upon her. This court has also held that 
"elementary it is that in construing contract we 
seek to determine the intention of the parties. 
But it is also elementary and of extreme practical 
importance that we hold contracting parties to i 
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their clear and understandable language 
deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by 
them as signatories thereto. Were this not so, 
business with one another among our citizens would 
be relegated to the chaotic and the basic purpose 
of the law to supply enforceable rules of conduct 
for the maintenance and improvement of an orderly 
society's welfare and progress would find itself 
impotent." 
Howard v Town of North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 
261 (Utah 1958), 
To impose upon all of the signatories to a 
contract, a duty to perform obligations which are 
clearly assigned by the contract to another party, 
turns basic contract law on its head and would if 
regularly pursued by the courts result in such 
chaos as to destroy the fundamental right of 
citizens to contract. 
The plain language of the contract at issue here clearly 
establishes that Eagle Mills was to purchase and pay for the 
stock owned by Johnsons. There is nothing in the plain 
language of the contract nor in the extrinsic evidence 
admitted at trial to suggest that it was ever the intention 
of the parties at the time the agreement was made to hold 
Slaugh responsible as guarantor for the obligations of Eagle 
Mills, Inc. The trial court correctly found that each of the 
parties had separate obligations under the contract and 
ordered Slaughs to perform the obligations which they had 
agreed to perform. The trial court also correctly found that 
the obligations to purchase and pay for the stock of Johnson 
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set forth in paragraph 8 of the agreement was the sole and 
separate obligation of Eagle Mills and that Slaughs were not 
liable for that performance. 
The District Court erred in ascribing liability to 
Slaughs for the obligation set forth in the contract as 
belonging to Eagle Mills on the basis of the holdings in 
Anderson v Gardner, 647 P.2d 3 (Utah 1982) and Marveon Sign 
Company v Roennebeck, 694 P.2d 604 (Utah 1984). Both of 
these cases deal with the potential liabilities of 
individuals signing contracts in a representative capacity 
without restricting their signatures. Slaughs did not sign 
the contract in a representative capacity or as agents for 
another. They signed the contract as one of the three 
parties thereto and thereby assumed the obligations set forth 
in the contract as running to Slaughs and the holdings in 
Anderson v Gardner, and Marveon Sign v Roennebeck, cited 
above are wholly inapplicable to the facts before the court. 
It is fundamental in a multi-party contract that the 
contracting parties are liable only severally, if at all, for 
the non-performance of any specific contractural duties which 
each party severally may have undertaken to perform. Lithia 
Lumber Company v Lamb, 443 P.2d 647 (Oregon 1968). The fact 
that the Slaughs by signing the agreement as parties thereto 
had personal liability to perform those obligations which 
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they had agreed in the contract to perform did not thereby 
impose blanket liability upon them for performance of the 
obligations of either of the other two parties to the 
contract. 
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKED A SUFFICIENT 
BASIS AND MADE INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS 
TO ALLOW IT TO OVERTURN THE FACTUAL 
FINDINGS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
The District Court announced its decision before the 
effective date of the recent change in Rule 52(a) in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence the review of the Circuit 
CourtTs findings of fact was still governed by the earlier 
appellate standard announced in several cases by the Utah 
Supreme Court. This standard proclaimed that factual 
findings of the trial court would not be set aside if they 
are adequately supported by the evidence. Wessel v Erickson 
Landscaping Company, 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985). This Court 
has ruled repeatedly that the findings of fact of a lower 
court will enjoy deferential treatment on review, and will 
not be overturned of supported by substantial evidence. 
Piactelli v Southern Utah State College. P.2d 1063 (Utah 
1981); Hal Taylor and Associates v Unionamerica, Inc., 657 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1982); King Keller v Bough, 660 P.2d 233 
(Utah 1983); Horton v Horton, 695 P.2d 1982 (Utah 1984); 
Bennion v Hansen, 699 P.2d 757( Utah 1985). 
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In this case substantial evidence more than adequately 
supports the findings of the Circuit Court. Paragraph 8 of 
the agreement states unambiguously that the Johnsons were to 
be paid by Eagle Mills, Inc. Even as it overturned the 
Circuit Court's findings, the District Court admitted that 
the agreement seemed to be between Eagle Mills and the 
Johnsons. As discussed, the extrinsic evidence also 
supported the Circuit Court's findings. Indeed, there is 
little, if any, evidence at all in the record to support 
contrary findings. 
Rather than address the question of whether or not the 
evidence adequately supported the Circuit Court's findings, 
the District Court chose to treat the entire case as turning 
on the question of whether or not the Slaughs had assumed 
personal liability on the agreement. While the question of 
personal liability had evidentiary value on the issue of the 
type of liability, it was not dispositive of the case. 
The District Court failed to make any finding at all 
concerning the adequacy of the evidence to support the 
Circuit Court's findings. The District Court discussed no 
testimony, examined none of the exhibits, and made no 
analysis of the agreement beyond looking at the signature 
lines. Therefore, not only did the District Court lack a 
sufficient basis for overturning the Circuit Court's Findings 
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of fact, the District Court, in effect, overturned those 
findings without even addressing them. 
THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS PERTAINING 
TO THE EFFECT OF UNRESTRICTED SIGNATURES 
In its Ruling on Appeal, the District Court states that 
"[t]he only issue presented is whether an unrestricted 
signature on a contract establishes liability of the signer." 
Not only was this not the issue to be decided on appeal, it 
was not even the issue raised by the Johnsons in their 
Statement of Points and Authorities filed with the District 
Court in support of their Notice of Appeal. In their 
Statement of Points and Authorities, the Johnsons frame the 
issue as follows: "Are the defendants individally jointly 
and severally liable to the Plaintiffs for a balance due 
under the purchase agreement for the sum of $3,700.99 [sic]?" 
Thus, the Johnsons correctly ask not only whether the Slaughs 
have personal liability, but whether that liabiliy is joint 
and several. 
The District Court then accurately points out that the 
Slaughs signed the agreement in their individual capacity, 
without any restrictions, and that James Slaugh had also 
signed separately as President of Eagle Mills, Inc. The 
District Court briefly discussed Anderson v Gardner, 647 
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P.2d 3 (Utah 1982), and Marveon Sign Co. v Roennebeck, 694 
P.2d 604 (Utah 1984), as establishing "that a person who 
signs his name to a contract is personally obligated unless 
his signature is restricted to a representative capacity." 
The District Court held that the rule established in Gardner 
and Roennebeck does not require that the liabiliy incurred 
be joint or joint and several. Personal liability and 
several liability are perfectly compatible concepts and there 
is no evidience that the Circuit Court misapplied the law in 
finding personal and several liability on the part of the 
Slaughs. Rather, the appellants resectfully suggest that it 
is the District Court which has misapplied the law in this 
case. 
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW PLAINTIFFS TO BE HEARD ON 
ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS, BUT CONSIDERED 
BY THE COURT 
Due process require that litigents to be afforded an 
opportunity to be heard and given an opportunity to respond 
to arguments and procedures in an orderly fashion. Nelson v 
Jacobson 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). 
The District Court, after receiving memoranda from 
Plaintiff and Defendant, stated in its ruling that the only 
issue presented is whether an unrestricted signature on a 
contract established liability of the signer. That statement 
- 14 -
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implies a finding of fact that the signatures were 
unrestricted. 
There is no finding by the trial court of unrestricted 
signing. The evidence is clearly contrary. Defendants 
signed in two (2) separate places indicating Slaughs 
agreement to perform the covenants relating to them and also 
signed as an officer of the corporation to signify the 
corporation's agreement to be bound by the portion of the 
contract relating to it. 
The court obviously considered issues not presented on 
appeal by the parties and has assumed facts not in the 
record. The court's refusal of Defendants Slaugh's Motion 
for rehearing deprived them an opportunity of addressing the 
issues and clarifying the facts or pointing the court to the 
mistakes of facts. Such refusal was a denial of principals 
of basic fairness encompassed in due process clause of U.S. 
CONST, amend. V and XIV and UTAH CONST, art I, §7 
CONCLUSION 
The factual findings of the Circuit Court are entitled 
to deference on review, the standard of appellate review by 
the District Court was misapplied. 
Although not every mistake by a District Court when 
hearing an appeal raises a constitutional issue, this case 
-- 15 -
presents a situation where the District Court ignored factual 
findings to which it should have paid deference and then 
misapplied the legal principle involved. By asking the wrong 
question, and then mishandling the analysis of that question, 
the District Cort as denied these appelants due process of 
law. 
Respectfully submitted this (j day of June, 1987. 
BENNETT & JUDD, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
James Slaugh and Deanna Slaugh 
TCirk C. Be 
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ADDENDUM A <• " ^ .-Q. C,^ U O M O 
AGREEMENT Bv\ Vv/<\%V \ t V i n n ) 
Agreement made this f/ day of June, 1985, between Eagle 
Mills, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and Murray Johnson and Pamela 
Johnson, residents of Uintah County, Utah, hereinafter referred 
to as Johnson, and James Slaugh and Deanna Slaugh, residents of 
Uintah County, Utah, hereinafter referred to as Slaugh. 
RECITALS 
A. Johnson and Slaugh are the incorporators and owners of 
100% of the stock of Eagle Mills. 
B. Eagle Mills has experienced financial difficulties 
making it impossible to continue in business without additional 
capital. 
C. Slaugh and Johnson have pledged substantial property to 
secure debts of Eagle Mills. 
D. Eagle Mills presently has outstanding current payables 
and current receivables of an approximately equal amount. 
E. In order to avoid bankrupctcy or receivorship it is 
necessary that Eagle Mills be sold to, or enter into, a joint 
venture with an outside party to obtain additional capital. 
F. Eagle Mills is in default on various long terra and short 
term obligations. 
G. The action set forth below is necessary in order to 
facilitate the reorganization of Eagle Mills and to avoid 
bankruptcy or receivorship, and the loss by Slaugh and Johnson of 
the property they have pledged to secure Eagle Mills' debts. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and 
covenants contained herein, and the benefit to be derived by the 
parties hereto, the sufficiency of which is hereby stipulated and 
acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: « 
1. Slaugh and Johnson hereby assume'personal responsibility 
for the payment of the current payables of'Eagle Mills; a list of 
which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A". 
2. Eagle Mills hereby assigns and sets over to Slaugh and 
Johnson for the sole purpose of payment of the obligations listed 
in Exhibit "A" above, all receivables of Eagle Mills Existing on 
the books as of June (| , 1985, including receivables for jobs in 
progress as of said date but not yet completed, a list of said 
receivables is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 
"B". 
3. All receivables shall be paid to Slaugh and collected by 
Slaugh, and Slaugh shall utilize said money to pay current 
payables of Eagle Mills, 
4. Slaugh shall prepare and provide to Johnson on a monthly 
basis an accounting of receivables collected and payables paid. 
5. Any excess receivables over payables up * to an'amount of 
$5,000.00 shall be paid to Slaugh. . 
6. Any amount in excess of said $5,000.00 shall be divided 
equally between Johnson and Slaugh. 
7. Any deficiency in the amount of payables over 
receivables shall be divided and paid as follows: Fifty percent 
(50%) by Slaugh, fifty percent (50%) by Johnson. 
8. Johnson shall sign over to Eagle Mills the 200 shares of 
stock owned by Johnson in Eagle Mills in consideration of the 
agreement of Eagle Mills to pay to Johnson and to Peggy Greely, 
jointly, the sum of $7,500.00. 
9. The stock shall be signed over to the corporation on the 
following schedule: one half of the Johnson shares shall be 
signed over to the corporation upon execution of this agreement 
and payment of $3,750.00 by the corporation to Johnson.and Peggy 
Greely. ...,,:.• . 
10. The remaining 100 shares shall be signed,over to the 
corporation at such time as documents are signed to release the 
property of Johnson and Slaugh from the long term obligations 
held by Player and Willyard and upon payment of the remaining 
$3,750.00. ...-,,. 
11. Johnson agrees that Slaugh may negotiate on behalf of 
the corporation for the sale of said corporation, or a part 
thereof, or the ^entry of said corporation into a joint venture 
for the purpose of salvaging said corportion, and obtaining a 
release from, or an assumption of, the long term debts and 
obligations of said corporation including those securred by the 
real and personal property of Johnson and Slaugh. 
12. Slaugh shall use all reasonable efforts to obtain a 
release of the real and personal property of Johnson and Slaugh 
which was used to secure loans which formed the initial operating 
capital of Eagle Mills, and to obtain from outside sources an 
assumption of other unsecurred long term obligations including 
the Bowan note, the Joe Hall note, and the rent owed on the 
premises. 
13. The 1984 Ford LTD leased by Johnson from Willey Ford 
and used by Johnson shall be disposed of by Johnson in the manner 
elected by Johnson, provided that Johnson shall assume full 
responsibility for the payments of amounts owed to Willey Ford on 
said lease after June, 1985, and shall indemnify and hold 
harmless the other parties hereto from any liability or 
deficiency payments thereon, or arising therefrom. . » 
14. It is agreed and understood that Slaugh shall attempt 
to negotiate agreements with Player and Willyard, Certified 
Industrial Supply, PCC, or Clyde Cottrel, for'the bail out of 
Eagle Mills and the assumption of the debts and obligations of 
Eagle Mills and Slaugh is hereby authorized to enter into such 
agreements on behalf of the corporation provided that said 
agreements include provisions that the property owned by Johnson 
and the property owned by Slaugh which is encumbered and pledged 
as security for debts of the corporation be released from 
obligation for debts of the corporation and that properly 
executed deeds of reconveyance be provided within forty-five (45) 
days to the parties hereto. If the release of the property owned 
by Johnson and Slaugh cannot be completed within forty-five (45) 
days after execution of this agreement, then this agreement may 
be voided by the parties and the 100 shares of stock signed over 
by Johnson may be returned to Johnson upon repayment to the 
corporation of the $3,750.00 paid therefore. 
15. It is mutually agreed and understood that the 
assumption by Slaugh and Johnson of the obligations set forth on 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto is enforceable only by Eagle Mills 
and is not made for the benefit of any of the creditors listed on 
Exhibit "A". 
16. This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, 
successors, and assigns of the parties hereto. 
17. In the event any party hereto breaches this agreement 
or fails to perform any of the terms or provisions hereof, the 
party or parties not in breach or default may recover their costs 
and attorney fees incurred in enforcing this agreement. 
18. This agreement is made in Uintah County, Utah and shall 
be interpreted pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, and 
• • • i •• • . 
venue in any action to enforce said agreement shall lie in Uintah 
County, Utah. 
This agreement executed this day of June, 1985. 
JOHNSO 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UINTAH 
Pamela S. John/son 
>. 
) ss. 
) 
On t h e (I day of J u n e , 1985 
Murray J o h n s o n and Pamela S . 
i n s t r u m e n t , w-ho% d u l y a d k n o w l e d g 
s a m e . - - " ""- '" \ 
red b e f o r e me 
of t h e a b o v e 
e x e c u t e d t h e 
My c o i n m i s s i o n exj^nr\ 
y-/? -^y 
es: 
Notary 
Residing at Vernal, Utah 
4 
SLAUGH 
J/t*h£4 
James Slaugh 
Af^^fr^ /, 
)eanna Slaugh 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UINTAH 
) 
) ss. 
) 
On the ( [ day of June, 1985, personally appeared before me 
James Slaugh, and Deanna Slaugh, Life signer of the above 
instrument, who duly adknowledged fro/me that they executed the 
same.. V'-
My commission ejfju^es: 
f-f7-$r^ 
A11 e s t i 
Notary/ Public C^ T^ 
Residing at Vernal, Utah 
LLS CORPORATION 
, J/&lt1 
Pame"la S. Jo Secretary 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UINTAH 
/^n^p^ 
Slaugh 
On the ji day of June, 1985, personally appeared before 
me James Slaugh who being by me duly sworn did say that he is the 
president and chairman of the board of directors of Eagle Mills, 
Inc., and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of its bylaws (or resolution of its 
board of directors, as the case m a y / ^ e ) , and said James Slaugh 
acknowledged to me that said corporatJuon/executecL^fi^fi^same. 
My commission ejt-pires 
'-/7-^?:-;— 3-
Notary 
Residing at Vernal, Utah 
4 
MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF THE SHAREHOLDERS AND BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS OF EAGLE MILLS, INC., THIS [( DAY OF JUNE, 1985. 
Special meeting of the board of directors and shareholders 
of Eagle Mills, Inc., was called to order by the president and 
chairman of the board, James S. Slaugh, all directors and 
shareholders were present. 
It was moved and seconded that the following resolution be 
adopted by the corporation. 
Resolved that the president/chairman of the board and 
secretary of the corporation are authorized to execute on behalf 
of Eagle Mills, Inc., that certain agreement dated June [\ , 
1985, between Eagle Mills, Inc., and Murray Johnson and Pamela 
Johnson and James Slaugh and Deanna Slaugh and further, resolved, 
That the signing of these minutes by the directors and 
shareholders shall constitute full ratification thereof, and 
waiver of notice of the meeting by the signatories. 
There being no further business to come before the meeting 
upon motion duly made, seconded and unanimously carried, the 
meeting was adjourned. .•:.•••.•, •: jii^* .•:-> ..-,.•. 
Date: "~3««^6- // (*?&?? 
Time: I*5D p>*m 
-r&T 
FFIALIATED METALS 
LEXANDER ANS. SVC. 
10C0 OIL CO. 
SHLEY VALLEY WATER 
DWDEN WELDING 
& W METALS 
UDS DRILL COLLAR 
3MMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS 
JCCHETTI & BALDWIN 
DLT TRUCKING 
HIVERS HOTSHOT 
UTTER MACHINE 
INALAND CO. CLUB 
OTCO 
ASTDIDE MACHINE 
EDERAL EXPRESS 
& K SVCS 
DGHES/ONCOR 
JDRAULICS INC. 
.G. SPECIALISTS 
ONES TRUCKING 
UDD ANS. SVC. 
LUN TRUCKING 
AGNASONIC 
ILLER WELDING 
ORCON 
ORTHWEST INSPEC 
RMSTON TRANSPOR. 
RAIRIE INN STANDARB 
OCKMOUNT 
EBEL YELL INC 
LY INSPECTION 
TIREADED STEEL 
'-M- TOOL 
ADLOCK PIPE 
'IMESAVER (MAGNUM) 
•IMESAVER (E.M.I.) 
FHITMORE OXYGEN 
FESTSIDE 66 
ULLEY LEASING CO (Tks.) 
(car) 
/INNER MACHINE 
HO. TRANSP. TIRE 
:iONS LEASING CO 
).E. ACCT. 
AXES (Est.) 
(fist. Penalties) 
TOTAL 
** -f 6// 
351.10 
105.60 
236.00 
480.74 
56.00 
286.00 
7415.24 
1369.50 
288.37 
374.20 
868.36 
3000.00 
310.80 
429.24 
8676.45 
178.00 
25.00 
382.20 
1166.12 
300.67 
150.00 
325.05 
180.00 
357.00 
295.00 
1854.85 
138.39 
300.00 
298.61 
1330.15 
486.17 
265.84 
100.00 
2380.48 
59.19 
122.02 
2802.00 
2799^97 
229*68 
1462.57 
3007.47. 
568,59 
1047.80 
245.76 
v-332.04 
v
 400.00 
$47,838.22 
24,154.95 
2.000.00 
$73,993.17 
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UYA1^ ir/ore Z-yj. F'j/j>: 
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P TUBOSCOPE 
BERT SMITH & SONS 
DGER OIL 
WEN TOOLS, INC 
TCO 
EVRON 
STOM WELLHEAD 
ES DOWNHOLE 
VES DRILLING 
ILTROL 
R.C. 
XON 
RST NAT'L PIPE 
RREST OIL CO 
OSS, SCOTTY 
LEMARK DRILLING 
T IRON CO 
O.R. 
NMAR 
IRCON 
iNTGOMERY DRILLING 
.RTA-CO 
IUNTAIN WEST OIL 
:COR 
IWSCO 
E.P. 
!TCO 
5ASE 
JINEX 
)YAL PIPE SERVICE 
'IDLE SALES 
)HIO PETROLEUM 
TARLIGHT WELDING 
-M TOOL 
H-STATE 
rex 
ESTERN CO. 
313.14 
211.17 
68.49 
2376.50 
1765.89 
1380.41 
1725.65 
697.58 
3475.61 
315.00 
871.39 
18,849.88 
356.00 
11,768.12 
45.31 
296.46 
3466.80 
2055.61 
1659.66 
4063.94 
6825.13 
913.90 
84.00 
2027.25 
49.49 
1672.00 
79.00 
957.86 
42.15 
421.50 
2846.00 
22,615.42 
299.26 
262.76 
120.00 
663.86 
342.38 
$95,984.57 
"' 'i 
Useable Cash $60,629.78 
ENTALS: 
OPEN D»T. - $26,054.85 
STIMATED OPEN WORK ORDERS: $4,000.00 
Useable Cash $11,315.78 
. . • | I : 
1
 j 4,000.00 
Total Useable Cash $75.945.56 
LEASES 
illey Leasing Co 
ions Leasing Co 
hase Commercial Corp 
Feb. 8, .1984 1984 Ford F260 
Feb. 8, 1984 1984 Chev 1-Ton 
July 5, 1984 Typewriter,Copy 
Machines 
July 27, 1984 Telephones 
Nov. 9, 1984 Telephones 
INSURANCE 
$512.19 mo. Orlg. $12,292.56 
$634.71 mo. Orig. $15,233.04 
$158.51 mo. Orig. $4419.00 
$ 69.66 mo. Orig. $1927.00 
$ 48.76 mo. Orig. $1470.00 
astern Utah Ins, Agency Balance; 10,892.00 h Premium 5446.00 
-2000.00 
$3446.00 Due Bal. $1089.20 mo. 
& H Services 
owen Tools, Inc. 
NOTES 
March 1, 1985 $2000.00 mo. Balance Due $21,751.78 PO ?May, i<>i 
March 1, 1985 $6627.97 mo. Balance Cue $56,775.23 PO Feb I ; «. 
" . r. I'M.. !'l i . , 
i 
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SEVENTH CffiCUIT COURT, STAl^ OF UTAH 
UINTAH COUNTY, VERNAL C I V I L DEPAKIMENT 
FILED 
mmnwmJS!SS^L.u 
MURRAY JOHNSON a n d PAMELA Plaintiff I 
JOHNSON, I CASE NUMBER 85CV3U8 OCT 2 7 1986 
DUOV/MIY LUVyU, ^LLdK 
s% m RV / U^~KtsyhpP[ ITV 
DATED February 28, 1986 
EAGLE MILLS, INC., JAMES Defendant 1 WHITNEY D. HAMMOND, JUDGE 
SLAUGH and DEANNA SLAUGH, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Having taken this matter under advisement and having now reviewed the 
testimony and evidence presented at the trial, the Court finds that the 
Agreement dated June 11, 1985, (Exhibit #1) was entered into and signed by 
three entities: (1) Eagle Mills, Inc., a Utah Corporation; (2) Murray Johnson 
and Pamela Johnson, referred to as Johnson in the contract; and (3) James Slaugh 
and Deanna Slaugh, referred to as Slaugh. 
In Paragraph 8 of the contract, Eagle Mills, Inc. agreed to pay Johnson 
$7500.00 for 200 shares of stock. Payment of this amount was the obligation of 
Eagle Mills and not the responsibility of Slaughs. Johnsons, therefore, have no 
cause of action against Slaughs for the balance remaining due for said stock. It 
is to be noted that on January 17, 1986, the Court granted plaintiffs motion for 
Default Judgment against Eagle Mills, Inc. 
Paragraph 4 required Slaugh to prepare and provide Johnson with an accounting 
of receivables collected and payables paid on a monthly basis. Slaughs testified 
that the books and records were open for Johnson to go over at any time. This 
does not satisfy the provision of the contract. The Slaughs are, therefore, 
ordered to "prepare and provide" Johnson with this required accounting. 
According to the testimony at the trial, Johnson had never requested the 
required monthly accounting prior to the filing of the Conplaint. No attorneys 
fees are awarded to either party. 
DATED this 28th day of February, 1986. 
BY THE COURT 
On February 28, 1986 copies of this Memoc^hdum Decision were mailed to 
Mr. Robert M. McRae Mr. Dennis L. Judd 
Attorney at Law " /* I Attorney at Law 
209 East 100 North / / 319 West 100 South, Suite B 
